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During the last two decades the relationship between competition and performance￿ related￿ pay
(PRP) has been investigated both from the theoretical and the empirical perspective. However,
most of the literature has focused on the incentive pay of CEOs and little attention has been
paid to lower layer employees. An exception in the empirical literature is Cuæat and Guadalupe
(2005), who also analyze the e⁄ect of changes in competition on worker compensation. However,
in the theoretical literature, attention has been paid exclusively to the question of how the design
of adequate individual incentives is a⁄ected by changes in the competitive environment. This
has given valuable insights into the relation between a ￿rm￿ s CEO and its owners. However,
for low-tier employees the individual￿ based approach is expected to be too narrow and to give
only incomplete insights. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model
which yields testable predictions of how changes in competition a⁄ect incentive pay at di⁄erent
layers of a ￿rm￿ s hierarchy.
Most of the results in the empirical literature on executive compensation are summarized
in Murphy (1999). The main results are that (1) incentive compensation increases with ￿rm
size, though the relation between CEO pay and ￿rm size has weakened over time, (2) pay-
performance sensitivities vary across industries, and are particularly low in regulated industries,
(3) pay-performance sensitivities have become larger in recent years because of the trend to-
wards more competition due to the spread of information technologies, the reduction of barriers
to entry, waves of deregulation and the reduction in transport costs. The theoretical literature
mainly supports these ￿ndings. Schmidt (1997), Raith (2003) and Vives (2004) analyze a
two￿ stage game in which ￿rms consisting of a principal and an agent compete in an imperfect
market. The principal uses incentive payments to incite agents to choose an unobservable ef-
fort level to reduce production costs. They show that there are two counteracting e⁄ects on
incentive provision when competition increases. On the one hand, there is a business￿ stealing
e⁄ect which induces ￿rms to provide higher powered incentive schemes because with more com-
petition any cost advantage more easily attracts business from rival ￿rms. On the other hand,
there is a scale e⁄ect which induces ￿rms to reduce incentives because with more competition
market shares decrease and ￿rms have less to gain from possible cost advantages. Which of the
two e⁄ects dominates is generally ambiguous, though Vives (2004) ￿nds that for most of the
di⁄erent competitive speci￿cations used in the literature the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates the second
one. Therefore, the theoretical prediction is that more competition increases the steepness of
performance-related pay.
Cuæat and Guadalupe (2005) analyze the e⁄ect of increasing competition not only on CEO
pay but also on the compensation schemes of executives and workers in the UK in the late
nineties. They con￿rm the results for CEO￿ s and ￿nd that more competition increases the
steepness of performance￿ related￿ pay in all layers. However, the e⁄ect weakens and is mostly
not signi￿cant for lower layers in the ￿rm. With the theoretical results concerning the relation-
ship between competition and PRP at hand, this is a surprising result for two reasons. First,
Burgess and Metclafe (2000) show, also for a large sample of UK ￿rms, that the adoption of
2PRP is greater, especially for low-tier employees, in ￿rms in environments with a low degree
of competition than in those operating under a high degree of competition. For example, the
number of ￿rms that apply PRP for occupations like sales, skilled manual clerical/secretary
and unskilled manual multiplies by eight, ￿ve, four and a half and four, respectively, while it
only multiplies by three for managers. Second, there is a vast amount of empirical evidence
to suggest that PRP at lower layers yields considerable productivity gains.1 More competition
should be expected to increase the pressure to realize potential productivity gains and therefore
accelerate the adoption of PRP schemes. Consequently, without further theoretical explanation
the results of Cuæat and Guadalupe (2005) can be seen to support the wide-spread view that
executive compensation is not intended to be incentive e¢ cient but used by CEOs as a means
of self￿ enrichment where changes in competition serve as a pretext to increase PRP. As a re-
sult, the PRP of CEOs increases more than proportionally compared to the PRP of low￿ tier
employees.2
The theoretical models on PRP do not specify the kind of agent the principal contracts.
Thus, one might expect that the predictions can be applied to employees at any ￿rm layer.3
However, there are two reasons why the results cannot be applied directly to lower layers of the
￿rm. First, at lower layers team work is a pervasive feature (c.f. Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003).
The reward for participating in teams is likely to be some form of group￿ based pay or joint
performance evaluation which has di⁄erent characteristics to the individual￿ based schemes we
￿nd for CEOs. One major di⁄erence is that group￿ based incentives can be undermined by free
riders. Though the free￿ rider problem can be mitigated by peer pressure (Kandel and Lazear,
1992), decentralized decision making (Baker, 1992) and long-term relationships (Che and Yoo,
2001) it usually results in lower powered incentive schemes than those of individual￿ based
PRP.4 Therefore, changes in competition should also be expected to have di⁄erent impacts on
low-tier PRP schemes compared to those of CEOs. Especially the question of how changes
in competition a⁄ect free￿ riding should be addressed here. Second, in single￿ principal￿ single￿
agent models changes in competition have no employment e⁄ects but these e⁄ects might be
considerable for agents at lower layers. For example, Gri¢ th, Harrison and Macartney (2006)
￿nd that increased product market competition reduced unemployment in OECD countries in
the 1980s and 1990s. Of course, changes in employment might also be expected to a⁄ect the
wage setting process and thereby the structure of incentive schemes. Therefore, again, the
results from single￿ principal￿ single￿ agent models should not be applied straightforwardly to
incentive pay at lower layers.
The aim of this paper is to extend former models which analyze the relationship between
performance￿ related￿ pay and market competition by explicitly including employment e⁄ects
which changes in competition may cause. It thereby aims to close the gap between studies
1An excellent overview on the results of case studies, intra-industry analyses and national cross-industry
studies is Ichniowski and Shaw (2003).
2See also Bolton et al. (2006) who develop a model that provides a di⁄erent persepective on this view.
3See, for example, Cuæat and Gaudalupe (2005, p.1060).
4See, for example, Jensen and Murphy (1990), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) and Che and Yoo
(2001).
3that analyze the e⁄ect of competition on individual￿ based PRP like Schmidt (1997), Raith
(2003) and Vives (2004) and those that analyze group￿ based PRP from an organizational
perspective that excludes explicit modelling of changes in the product market (see Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1990), Varian (1990), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991), Itoh (1991, 1992, 1993)
and Macho-Stadler and PØrez-Castrillo (1993) as examples for this approach). In this paper,
product market competition and incentive payments are the result of a multi￿ stage game in
which ￿rms are modeled as a three￿ tier hierarchy. At the top tier the principal designs contracts
of second and third tier employees. Contract design is complicated by the unobservability of
subordinates￿e⁄ort choices. That is, principals in each ￿rm must solve moral hazard problems.
It is assumed that the unique commonly observable and veri￿able variable is ￿rm output. Thus,
all contracts must be based on this variable. The advantage of the model is that it allows to
analyze the e⁄ect of changes in competition on di⁄erent layers of a hierarchy using the same
unit of incentive measure. This enables us to see if the hierarchical level is responsible for
di⁄erences in the e⁄ect of changes in competition and not the speci￿c choice of the incentive
measure.
The main di⁄erence between the group￿ based approach and the single￿ principal single￿
agent models is that ￿rms can react to changes in competition not only by changing employees￿
e⁄ort but also by adapting the number of employees to new market conditions. However, if the
labor inputs of third-tier employees are substitutable and if PRP is group￿ based this will a⁄ect
the free￿ riding of third￿ tier employees. Therefore, any change in competition which a⁄ects ￿rm
size will a⁄ect third￿ tier and mid￿ tier employees di⁄erently. For mid-tier employees we assume
that labor inputs are not substitutable and that free-riding therefore is a minor issue. Firm size
(the number of employees) itself is determined by the costs of entry and labor market conditions.
The paper shows that this gives rise to two kinds of heterogeneities. First, PRP sensitivities
di⁄er between employees at di⁄erent hierarchical levels of the ￿rm, or more generally, between
employees whose labor inputs are substitutable and whose performance cannot be measured
individually and those whose labor inputs are either di¢ cult to substitute or whose performance
can be measured individually. Second, PRP sensitivities of third￿ tier agents di⁄er between ￿rms
which react to changes in competition by changing their employees￿e⁄orts and those which also
change employment, or between ￿rms that operate in closed markets and those that operate in
markets with low barriers to entry. Taken together, the results explain the discrepancy between
empirical studies that use aggregate ￿rm data and those that are based on individual or ￿rm
data. The former ￿nd that incentive pay￿ performance sensitivities have signi￿cantly increased
in recent years for CEO￿ s while they have remained nearly unchanged at lower tiers. This is
because the aggregation of heterogeneous ￿rm data means that di⁄erent responses to changes
in competition at lower tiers compensate each other while they work in the same direction at
mid and top tiers. Firm or case studies however, con￿rm that ￿rms in many circumstances
have substantially increased PRP at lower tiers after a change in the competitive environment.
However, the handicap of these studies is that their ￿ndings cannot be generalized. Therefore,
one of the main insights of the model is that future studies should take into account the kind
of heterogeneities which have been identi￿ed when ￿rm and individual data is aggregated.
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows the market
equilibrium values. Section 4 analyzes the e⁄ects of changes in the competitiveness of markets
under alternative assumptions concerning the endogeneity of di⁄erent variables. Finally, Section
5 concludes. All proofs are con￿ned to the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The framework
1. The ￿rm. There are n identical ￿rms. Each ￿rm i is represented as a three￿ tier hierarchy.
The hierarchy consists of one principal (Pi) at the top of the hierarchy or at layer 1, one agent
(A2i) at layer 2 and a team of Ki agents (A3ik, k = 1;:::;Ki) at layer 3. The agents in each
￿rm jointly produce a marketable output qi for the principal. The principal makes all entry,
personnel (she chooses the value of Ki), and production decisions. The mid-tier agent, also
called supervisor, controls the agents at tier 3, also called workers.
2. Production. The agents contribute to production by choosing two levels of e⁄ort, one
that is observable to the principal and that is non-observable to her. Denote agent A2i￿ s
unobservable e⁄ort choice by e2i 2 <+ and normalize the observable e⁄ort to unity. Similarly,
agent A3ik￿ s observable e⁄ort choice is denoted by e3ik 2 <+ and his observable e⁄ort choice
is normalized to unity. The general production technology is linear homogenous in capital
and total labor output. The units of capital employed in production are also normalized to
unity. The total worker￿ s unobservable labor output is
PKi
k=1 e3ik and their total observable
labor output is Ki, that is, a worker￿ s e⁄ort is perfectly substitutable, which implies that we
assume that workers perform essentially the same tasks without any synergy e⁄ects. Supervisors
produce ￿supervision￿ , ￿control￿and ￿coordination￿of the workers￿tasks. We assume that
total labor output increases with more coordination for any given level of workers￿labor output.












where e3i = e3i1;:::e3ik;:::e3iKi, ￿1 > 0; ￿2 ￿ 0; and ￿3 ￿ 0.5 Notice that when there is no
unobservable e⁄ort (￿2 = ￿3 = 0), we have a traditional Cobb-Douglas production function
(with capital inputs normalized to unity). To simplify the exposition of the results we make:
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Finally, the production function displays non-increasing returns to scale:
5Similar team production functions have been applied by Beckmann (1977), or more recently, by Ferrall and
Shearer (1999).
5Assumption 1 ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3 ￿ 1.
3. Utility and contracts. The fact that individual e⁄ort is non-observable to the principal,
implies that she faces a moral hazard problem.6 Furthermore, because individual performance
measures are unavailable, this problem can only be solved by designing an appropriate group￿
incentive scheme. All agents are paid with an incentive scheme that has the form of a linear
transfer. For agent A3ik the transfer is t3ik = ￿3iqi + ￿3i. and for agent A2i the transfer
is t2i = ￿2iqi + ￿2i. That is, the contract includes a ￿xed payment and a variable payment
that depends on output.7 The transfers are chosen by the principal under the restriction
that ￿2i ￿ ￿2 and ￿3i ￿ ￿3: ￿2 and ￿3 represent industry wage levels which are determined
by the bargaining power of workers, supervisors and principals and includes compensation for
observable e⁄ort. Furthermore, notice that contracts are identical. Because agents are identical
this can be interpreted as a non-discrimination restriction imposed by workers.8 Agent A3ik
chooses his e⁄ort to maximize his utility U3ik = t3i ￿ 1
2e2
3ik. Similarly, agent A2i chooses his
e⁄ort to maximize U2i = t2i ￿ 1
2e2
2i.9 Notice that the supervisor￿ s e⁄ort cost increases with the
number of subordinates and the e⁄ort level chosen. Furthermore, marginal e⁄ort increases with
the number of subordinates taking into account the fact that coordination and control of tasks
become more di¢ cult as the number of subordinates grows. The principal￿ s objective is the
maximization of the ￿rm￿ s net pro￿ts ￿i = pqi ￿ t2i ￿ Kit3i ￿ F, where p is the market price
and F is ￿xed costs or entry costs.
4. Competition and demand. Competition is for a homogeneous good with inverse demand
function p = a ￿ bq, a > 0, b > 0, where q is aggregate output. n identical ￿rms enter the
market. For simplicity we assume that n is a continuous variable. With free entry ￿rms enter
until pro￿ts are zero. The objective of the paper is to analyze how incentive payments vary for
di⁄erent tiers when the size of the market changes. Market changes are analyzed by changes in
the slope parameter b. A decrease in b means that the market becomes larger and an increase
of b means that the market shrinks.
5. Timing. Competition and contracting are de￿ned to be a multi-stage game in which the
6Notice that unlike single￿ principal￿ single￿ agent models, we have not included a random term. However,
with team production the moral hazard problem stems from the fact that the principal cannot identify individual
e⁄ort from the observation of output though production is non￿ random (cf. Espinosa and Macho￿ Stadler, 2003).
7Lazear (2000) shows that this is a realistic assumption concerning the payment schemes applied for low￿ tier
employees in enterprises in industrial sectors. McAfee and McMillan (1991) analyze the conditions under which
it is optimal to use linear team contracts.
8In fact, ￿3i is also determined by a bargaining process. However, this process mostly takes place inside the
￿rm. Thus, while the ￿xed wage is assumed to be the same throughout the industry, performance-related-pay
can di⁄er between ￿rms but not between employees of the same ￿rm.
9A major di⁄erence in models that analyze managerial incentives is that agents are assumed to be risk￿
neutral. Consequently, there is no trade￿ o⁄ between risk and incentives like in Prendergast (2000) or Raith
(2003). However, due to the assumption of limited liability and the fact that the ￿xed wage is determined
exogenously, employees at lower tiers do not support much risk. Therefore, here, incentive pay is basically used
to stimulate production and the trade￿ o⁄ is between productivity gains and wage costs.
6sequence of events is as follows: At stage 1 the principals of all ￿rms simultaneously decide
the size of their ￿rm (Ki) and the remunerations (t2i and t3i) of her employees. At stage 2,
the supervisors choose their e⁄ort (e2i). At stage 3 agents A3ik observe their supervisor￿ s e⁄ort
and, simultaneously, make their own e⁄ort choice (e3ik). Then, ￿rms￿output and market price
are realized, the agents are paid and the principals obtain their pro￿ts.
2.2 E⁄ort choice
The market game is solved by backward induction. At stage 3 of the game, when agents A3ik
simultaneously choose their e⁄orts, they know the e⁄ort choice of their supervisors and the
number of workers in their ￿rm. Thus, optimal e⁄ort is given as the solution to
max
e3ik






We obtain that for a given incentive rate ￿3i, given supervisor e⁄ort e2i and given ￿rm size Ki


























￿3iqi + ￿3i: (4)
Equations (2) and (3) imply that A3ik￿ s e⁄ort increases as the incentive rate increases which
in turn increases ￿rm i￿ s output. From (4) we see that a worker￿ s utility is strictly positive.
This is the consequence of the limited liability assumption which implies that agents receive
an informational rent. Furthermore, a worker￿ s utility increases with the incentive rate of his
contract. Thus, ceteris paribus, agents at tier 3 prefer higher powered incentives. Notice that
workers cannot observe the e⁄ort choice of other workers in the ￿rm. Thus, when deciding their
own e⁄ort choice they face a free￿ rider problem. More e⁄ort yields higher output and therefore
higher wages. However, while a worker only receives part of his own e⁄ort contribution through
a wage increase, his wage also increases when other workers work more without any cost to
him. If workers could cooperatively implement their e⁄ort choices within a coalition, the e⁄ort
choice for each individual would be K
1
2￿￿3
i higher than the e⁄ort choice in (2).10 Therefore, as
expected, the e¢ ciency loss due to free￿ riding increases with ￿rm size.
10In this case the coaltion would solve maxe3i
PKi

































Notice, that the ￿rst-order constraint is su¢ cient for a maximum under assumption 1. Now,




















￿2iqi + ￿2: (8)
From equation (7) we ￿nd that the principal can increase ￿rm output (and pro￿ts) by employ-
ing more workers (by increasing Ki) or by increasing the PRP of workers and the supervisor
(by increasing ￿2i and ￿3i). However, from (4) and (8) we see that increasing PRP implies
that workers and the supervisor obtain higher informational rents which reduces the princi-
pal￿ s pro￿ts. The principal￿ s problem is to choose the combination of PRP schemes (and ￿rm
size) that maximizes ￿rm pro￿ts. In the next section this problem is analyzed under di⁄erent
endogeneity assumptions.
3 Market Equilibrium
How ￿rms react to changes in the competitiveness of markets depends on the time they have to
react. In the short run, if a ￿rm wants to increase production because market size has increased,
for example, it may only want or be able to increase the production e⁄ort of its employees.
However, in the mid term it might be more e¢ cient to increase employment instead, or both.
In the long run, an increase in production may increase industry pro￿ts and cause the entry of
new ￿rms in industries with low barriers to entry (cf. Raith, 2003). In this case, all decisions
concerning employment must also take into account the reactions of potential entrants. In the
remainder of this section, the e⁄ect of changes in competition on incentive rates under these
di⁄erent settings is analyzed.
83.1 Given ￿rm size and market structure
If ￿rm size cannot be adjusted, at stage 1, the principal chooses the wage contracts of her
employees to maximize ￿rm pro￿t. Formally, she solves the following program [P1]:
max
￿2i;￿2i;￿3i;￿3i
￿i = (a ￿ bq)qi ￿ (￿2iqi + ￿2i) ￿ Ki (￿3iqi + ￿3i) ￿ F (9)
s.t. (2), (6), U2i ￿ 0, U3ik ￿ 0;￿2i ￿ ￿2 and ￿3i ￿ ￿3.
The principals￿maximization problem is subject to incentive, participation and limited liability
constraints. The solution of [P1] yields:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which
each ￿rm chooses ￿2i = ￿2 de￿ned by:








￿2 = 0: (10)





and ￿xed payments are ￿2i = ￿2 and ￿3i = ￿3:
From proposition 1 we see that incentive rates depend on ￿rm size, market size and the
number of ￿rms. For the e⁄ect of changes in these variables on incentive rates we have:
Corollary 1 With given ￿rm size and market structure incentive rates of workers and su-
pervisors are higher in larger markets (@￿2i=@b jK;n< 0, @￿3i=@b jK;n< 0), lower in mar-
kets with more ￿rms (@￿2i=@n < 0, @￿3i=@n < 0) and lower in larger ￿rms (@￿2i=@K < 0,
@￿3i=@K < 0).
In larger markets the market share of ￿rms increases. Therefore, to produce more, it is
necessary to incite agents to make more e⁄ort. Thus, incentive rates increase. These results
are similar to those we can ￿nd in single￿ agent￿ single￿ principal models (cf. Raith, 2003 and
Schmidt, 1997). Concerning changes in ￿rm size, as we have seen above, in larger ￿rms the
free￿ rider problem is aggravated. So it becomes more costly for the principal to incite a given
e⁄ort level and from (2) and (11) we ￿nd that workers￿equilibrium e⁄orts and incentive rates
decrease when ￿rm size increases.
3.2 Endogenous ￿rm size and given market structure
If changes in competition are expected to be durable, the principal might want to adopt ￿rm





￿i = (a ￿ bq)qi ￿ (￿2iqi + ￿2i) ￿ Ki (￿3iqi + ￿3i) ￿ F (12)
s.t. (2), (6), U2i ￿ 0, U3ik ￿ 0;￿2i ￿ ￿2 and ￿3i ￿ ￿3.
9The only di⁄erence with respect to program P1 is that now the principal also maximizes with
respect to Ki. The solution of [P 0
1] yields:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which








































and ￿xed payments are ￿2i = ￿2 and ￿3i = ￿3:
The main characteristic of the agent￿ s incentive scheme is that it depends on two variables:
￿rm size and the ￿xed wage level. Furthermore incentive rates depend particularly on the
relative contributions of supervisors and workers to production. This is of practical impor-
tance when we compare the structure of incentive payments in di⁄erent industries or when
changes in competition lead to changes in task assignment and organizational structure. To see
how changes in di⁄erent measures of competition a⁄ect the incentive rates of supervisors and
workers, we start by analyzing the e⁄ect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on ￿rm
size.
Corollary 2 Equilibrium ￿rm size is higher in larger markets (@K￿=@b < 0) and in more
concentrated markets (@K￿=@n < 0).
The intuition of this result is straightforward. In larger markets or in more concentrated
markets ￿rms have a larger market share and produce more. Therefore, employment is in-
creased. Together, Corollary 1 and 2 imply that changes in the degree of competition have
counteracting e⁄ects on incentive rates when ￿rm size is an endogenous variable. On the one
hand, with an increase in a ￿rm￿ s market share the principal can increase production by increas-
ing production e⁄ort, which requires higher powered incentive schemes. On the other hand, she
can increase production by employing more agents, which aggravates free￿ riding and induces
lower incentive rates for workers but not for supervisors. From (11) we see that for workers
the second e⁄ect dominates the ￿rst one. In larger markets and in more concentrated markets
￿rm size increases and the workers￿incentive rates decrease. For supervisors both e⁄ects work
in the same direction. Therefore, in larger markets and in more concentrated markets their
incentive rate increases. The following result resumes these ￿ndings:
Corollary 3 With endogenous ￿rm size and given market structure workers￿incentive rates
are lower in larger markets (@￿3i=@b jn> 0) and in more concentrated markets (@￿3i=@n >
0). Supervisors￿ incentive rates are higher in larger markets (@￿2i=@b jn< 0) and in more
concentrated markets (@￿2i=@n < 0).
10The major di⁄erence between this result and Corollary 1 is that with endogenous ￿rm size
changes in the competitiveness of markets can have opposite e⁄ects on the incentive rates of
supervisors and workers. For example, the entry of ￿rms in the market reduces the market
share of incumbent ￿rms and therefore ￿rm production. This reduction is achieved by reducing
￿rm size. However, the reduction in ￿rm size means that the supervisor￿ s e⁄ort and incentive
rates are reduced while workers￿e⁄ort and incentive rates increase. This result therefore gives
an intuitive explanation for the results of Cuæat and Guadalupe (2005). Changes in the com-
petitiveness of markets a⁄ect CEO and executive pay￿ performance￿ sensitivities in the same
direction in ￿rms that respond to these changes with an increase in e⁄ort and those which
also increase employment, while workers￿pay-performance sensitivities are a⁄ected in opposite
directions in these two kinds of ￿rms. Therefore, when ￿rms with di⁄erent responses to changes
in the competitive environment are aggregated, the e⁄ect on PRP sensitivities of workers are
less signi￿cant than those of CEO￿ s and executives.
3.3 Endogenous ￿rm size and market structure
When market structure is endogenous, the number of ￿rms in the market is determined by the
cost of entry. This a⁄ects the forgoing analysis in two ways. On the one hand, a change in
market size will now also cause the entry or exit of ￿rms. On the other hand, a variation in the
costs of entry a⁄ects the variables of interest in the model only through changes in the number
of ￿rms whose implications we have already discussed. From substitution of equations (14) into










and from substitution of equations (14) and (15) into (12) we ￿nd that ￿rm i￿ s equilibrium
pro￿ts are








Using (13) this can be written as
￿i =
￿














￿ ￿2 ￿ F. (17)
In the long￿ run ￿rms enter until pro￿ts are zero and changes in the competitiveness of markets
a⁄ect the number of ￿rms and ￿rm size simultaneously. Then, the number and size of ￿rms in
equilibrium is determined by equation (13) and the zero pro￿t condition in (17). This yields:
Proposition 3 There exists a unique symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which
￿rms enter until pro￿ts are zero and where ￿rm size K￿ = K(b;F) and the number of ￿rms in




















￿ a = 0 (18)
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and ￿xed payments are ￿2i = ￿2 and ￿3i = ￿3:
Regarding changes in the competitiveness of markets because of variations in market size
or entry costs we get the following result:
Corollary 4 An increase in market size increases ￿rm size and causes entry (@K￿=@b < 0,
@n￿=@b < 0). An increase in entry costs increases ￿rm size and causes exit (@K￿=@F > 0,
@n￿=@F < 0).
This result comes from two counteracting e⁄ects on ￿rm size. The ￿rst e⁄ect, as we have
seen in Corollary 3, is that in larger markets ￿rm size will be larger. However, pro￿ts will also
be larger and so the second e⁄ect is that ￿rms will enter into the market, which decreases ￿rm
size. Corollary 4 indicates that if market size changes the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates the second. As
expected, we ￿nd that the equilibrium number of ￿rms is larger in larger markets and markets
with lower entry costs.
To analyze the e⁄ect of changes in competition on incentive rates, notice from (20) that
market size and entry cost a⁄ect incentive rates only indirectly through a change in ￿rm size.
Therefore, the results in Corollary 4 mean:
Corollary 5 With endogenous ￿rm size and market structure workers￿ incentive rates are
lower in larger markets (@￿3i=@b > 0) and in markets with higher entry costs (@￿3i=@F < 0).
Supervisors￿incentive rates are higher in larger markets (@￿2i=@b < 0) and in markets with
higher entry costs (@￿2i=@F > 0).
As far as supervisor incentive rates are concerned, this result is very similar to the ￿ndings of
Raith (2003). He also ￿nds that incentive rates are higher in larger markets and lower in markets
with lower entry costs. The main interest in Corollary 5 is how changes in competition a⁄ect
workers￿PRP. Changes in market size and entry cost have just the opposite e⁄ect on workers￿
incentive rates compared to those of supervisors. This di⁄erence can be explained as follows.
When market size increases ￿rms want to increase production. In single￿ principal￿ single￿
agent models like those of Raith (2003) and Vives (2005) this increase in production can only
be achieved by increasing the agent￿ s e⁄ort, which aggravates the moral hazard problem and
12requires stronger incentives. Here production can also be increased by employing more agents
and this is what happens when market structure is exogenous. However, when more agents are
employed the free￿ rider problem becomes more severe. Therefore, performance￿ related￿ pay is
reduced and workers make less e⁄ort. This implies that ￿rms produce with higher unit costs
per output. So, new entrants, which are smaller in size, will have a competitive advantage
and the incumbents must reduce ￿rm size to initial levels to be competitive. Thus, the free-
rider e⁄ect, which is not present in single￿ principal￿ single￿ agent models, is the driving force
behind the di⁄erence in the results we obtain. Again, as in the case for markets without entry,
we can explain why Cuæat and Guadalupe (2005) cannot ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects of changes in
competition on the incentives rates of workers (for whom there is a free￿ rider problem) while
they ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on those of CEO￿ s (without a free￿ rider problem) in
the same ￿rms.
4 Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that performance￿ related￿ pay sensitivities increase signi￿cantly
with product market competition for CEO￿ s. However, for workers, the e⁄ects of competition
are much weaker and mostly insigni￿cant (cf. Cuæat and Guadalupe (2005), p.1060). This is at
odds with theoretical results that suggest that, though the amount of incentive payments should
decrease with the hierarchical levels inside a ￿rm, PRP sensitivities should increase equally at
all levels with changes in competition. In this paper, a simple model of PRP in hierarchical
agency is developed. The three￿ tier hierarchy includes a principal at the top, a supervisor on
the mid tier and workers on the bottom tier. Incentive payments are used in the model because
of moral hazard problems concerning supervisor￿ s and workers￿e⁄ort levels, which determine
joint production.
The main results of the paper are displayed in Figure 1. We ￿nd that PRP on the lower
tiers of a ￿rm generates two kind of heterogeneities. First, changes in the competitiveness of
markets can have di⁄erent impacts on mid-tier and low￿ tier agents. The reason for this is that
when ￿rms apply group￿ incentive schemes and react to changes in competition by adjusting
employment, this adjustment a⁄ects the free￿ rider problem at lower tiers. Second, while a
￿rm￿ s reaction to changes in competition concerning the PRP of mid-tier agents is similar under
di⁄erent endogeneity assumptions, it is very sensitive to these assumptions when we consider
workers￿PRP. Firms that react to changes in competition by adjusting only their production
e⁄ort and ￿rms that also adjust employment will apply di⁄erent changes to the intensity of
workers￿PRP. The same is true for ￿rms that operate in closed markets and ￿rms that operate
in markets with low barriers to entry. Together, these two kinds of heterogeneities explain the
observation that the pay-performance sensitivities in worker contracts are signi￿cantly lower
than those in managerial contracts when aggregated ￿rm data is used.
Of course, this is not to say that free-riding is the only explanation for di⁄erences in PRP
13in di⁄erent hierarchical levels. Schmidt (1997) suggests that fear of liquidation (and a costly
search for a new job) can act as a spur in a more competitive market. Nalebu⁄ and Stiglitz
(1983) and Hart (1983) suggest that more competitors or more similar ￿rms might provide
better benchmarks and so it is easier to write high￿ powered incentives because one can ￿lter
out common components of performance. If these benchmarks already exist, as for example for
salesmen in a sales￿ force or managers of stores in large chains, one can expect that additional
competition might have a smaller e⁄ect on the power of performance contracts. This also can
explain a more muted e⁄ect on lower tier employees than CEOs.
Though the results have been obtained under very speci￿c assumptions, they can be gen-
eralized for several reasons. First, the results depend on the assumption that worker￿ s labor
inputs are perfect substitutes. However, this is just the contrary assumption to Raith (2003)
and Vives (2005) where the assumption that the results also apply to lower levels of the ￿rm hi-
erarchy implicitly implies that workers￿contributions are completely independent. Thus, with
less substitutability, the e⁄ects found in this paper will also be present while the impact of
changes in competition on ￿rm size will be lower and the results concerning e⁄ort and incentive
rates will be closer to those of Raith (2003) and Vives (2005). Second, we have used ￿rm output
as a common unit of incentive measurement. However, concerning top-tier agents we get similar
results regarding the e⁄ects of changes in competition on PRP as in models which use other
units of measurement, like pro￿ts or cost reductions. The e⁄ect of changes in competition on
di⁄erent layers of a hierarchy using the other units of incentive measure should therefore not
be expected to depend on the speci￿c unit of measurement. Finally, the results depend on the
assumption that changes in competition do not a⁄ect the task and job assignment within ￿rms.
However, a mayor e⁄ect of changes in competition may merely lead to a restructuring of these
conditions (cf. Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003). In this case, a change in the PRP sensitivities is
the consequence of the fact that workers perform di⁄erent tasks with di⁄erent responsibilities.
This analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
From problem [P1] we see that it is clearly optimal to set ￿2i = ￿2, and ￿3i = ￿3. Now,
equations (4) and (8) imply that U3i ￿ 0 and U2i ￿ 0 if ￿3i ￿ 0, ￿2i ￿ 0 and qi ￿ 0. Assuming









qi ￿ ￿2i ￿ Ki￿3i
!
qi ￿ ￿2 ￿ Ki￿3 ￿ F (21)





































￿ Kiqi = 0 8i: (23)
Using the symmetry assumption, Ki = K, and substituting
@qi














































In equilibrium, ￿2i = ￿2. Thus, ￿2 is implicitly de￿ned by









Notice that in equilibrium ￿2 > 0 because the left hand-side of (28) decreases in ￿2 and is a
for ￿2 = 0 and the right hand-side increases in ￿2 and is 0 for ￿2 = 0. Then, from (26) ￿3i > 0.
Therefore, qi > 0 and the participation constraints are satis￿ed (U3i ￿ 0 and U2i ￿ 0).
15PROOF OF COROLLARY 1:


































































, for x = b;n;K:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
From problem [P 0
1] we see that it is clearly optimal to set ￿2i = ￿2, and ￿3i = ￿3. Now,
equations (4) and (8) imply that U3ik ￿ 0 and U2i ￿ 0 if ￿3i ￿ 0, ￿2i ￿ 0 and qi ￿ 0. Assuming









qi ￿ ￿2i ￿ Ki￿3i
!
qi ￿ ￿2 ￿ Ki￿3 ￿ F: (32)










































































3i > 0: (38)
















i = ￿2i 8i; and; (40)
￿3
￿2Ki
￿2i = ￿3i 8i: (41)







































Because of symmetry, Ki = K, 8i. Then, in equilibrium we get that optimal ￿rm size K￿ is
implicitly de￿ned by
G(b;n;K




















￿1+" ￿ a: (45)
Existence and uniqueness are guaranteed because the left-hand side in (43) is strictly decreasing
in Ki and a for Ki = 0, while the right-hand side is strictly increasing and 0 for Ki = 0.
Therefore, in equilibrium Ki > 0, and from (40), (41) and (42) ￿2i > 0, ￿3i > 0 and qi > 0
such that the participation constraints are satis￿ed (U3i ￿ 0 and U2i ￿ 0). Now, (44) and (45)


































































































































































































































3i > 0: (57)





















































































































18Su¢ ciency is guaranteed by uniqueness of the extremum and since the Hessian matrix H is













































































































￿(2￿ + ￿2 + ￿3)(2 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3)b





















where Hi, i = 1;2;3 are the successive principal minors of H:
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2:



































































PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
When market structure is endogenous ￿rms enter until pro￿ts are zero. Therefore, n and K
are simultaneously determined by equation (13) and by setting the right-hand side of equation










































￿ ￿2 ￿ F = 0. (68)
19This yields
K
￿ = K(b;F); (69)
n
￿ = n(b;F): (70)
Existence is guaranteed for su¢ ciently large a in (67) and because from Corollary 2 we have
that K￿ is decreasing in n￿; which implies that pro￿ts decrease when n increases in (68).
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4:






















































because from (67) @G
@F = 0, and from (68)
@￿i
@F = ￿1, and
@￿i
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20PROOF OF COROLLARY 5:
The long-run equilibrium e⁄ects of changes in b, and F on incentive rates are:
d￿2i
db






































> 0; and (80)
d￿3i
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Figure 1. The in￿ uence of di⁄erent exogenous variables
on incentive rates under alternative endogeneity as-
sumptions.
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